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Will highly educated women have more children
in the future?
Maria Rita Testa∗
“Will highly educated women have more children in the future?” In this contribution,
I address this question by looking at both fertility and fertility intentions; i.e., the
number of children people plan to have over their reproductive lives. Intended births
are highly correlated with actual births, and in low-fertility settings, childbearing has
become associated with the couple’s agency.1 On the other hand, education, which
is a marker of income and social status, has remained an important driver of fertility
choices.2 Hence, understanding the reproductive decision-making of women and
men with low, medium, and high levels of education is crucial when seeking to
determine whether – and if so, to what extent – there is scope for additional policy
interventions aimed at raising fertility levels.
1 Introduction
In recent decades, increasing numbers of women have earned a tertiary or a higher
education degree. According to diﬀusion theory, individuals with high levels of
education tend to be trendsetters who engage in novel forms of behaviour that
are subsequently adopted by other societal groups (Goode 1993; Nazio 2008).
Indeed, highly educated couples have driven both the decline and the turnaround
in fertility levels observed over the past ﬁve decades (Esping-Andersen and
Billari 2015). In terms of family planning, highly educated women are expected
to diﬀer from their less educated counterparts. Past empirical evidence suggests
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1 Here, agency is deﬁned in a general sense as the intrinsic human capacity to make choices and act.
“Action depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a diﬀerence’ to a pre-existing state of
aﬀairs or course of events” (Giddens 1984: 14).
2 In countries where the highly educated women have lower second birth rates than the less educated
women, total fertility also tends to be low, and vice versa (van Bavel and Ro´z˙an´ska-Putek 2010).
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that the relationship between fertility intentions and education is not necessarily
identical to the relationship between actual fertility and education: i.e., that a highly
educated woman is more likely than a less educated woman to end her reproductive
life with fewer children than she had intended to have. This result is counterintuitive,
given that education competes with childbearing, and that highly educated women
and men may be expected to be more accurate than their less educated counterparts
when reporting the number of children they expect to have. One potential reason
for this apparent contradiction is the tendency to postpone childbearing and the
parity-speciﬁc distribution of fertility intentions (Sobotka 2009). If we look at the
distribution of highly educated women by their intended number of children, we see
a clear clustering around the option of having two children (Testa 2012). However,
oﬃcial statistics show that the average highly educated woman of all cohorts and
birth years has far fewer than two children (Sobotka et al. 2015). The question
of whether highly educated women will have more children in the future can be
rephrased as the question of whether the average highly educated woman will be
able to meet her goal of having a two-child family, and will thus be able to overcome
the disadvantage of starting her childbearing later in life. The issue is twofold: Will
the group who started the low fertility trend continue to have fewer children in the
future? How will the behaviour of the members of this group change if they become
more numerous, and are thus no longer a small “elite”?
2 Education and reproductive plans
Previous studies have provided contradictory ﬁndings regarding the relationship
between education and fertility intentions. Some studies have documented that
highly educated women are more likely than their less educated counterparts to
say they want to have or are planning to have a large family (e.g., Heiland et al.
2008; Mills et al. 2008); while other studies have found that better educated women
have lower completed fertility levels than less educated women. These apparent
discrepancies suggest that unplanned births or early childbearing are the reasons
for the higher fertility levels among less educated women (e.g., Musick et al. 2009;
Hayford 2009; Hayford and Guzzo 2016). A woman in a high-status occupation
may plan from the beginning of her reproductive career to have only a small
number of children (Friedman et al.1994), or she may decide later to have fewer
children than she had initially planned (Iacovou and Tavares 2011). In general,
better educated women are more likely than less educated women to say they
want to have their ﬁrst child later in life (Berrington 2004). This tendency to
delay childbearing may cause a woman to end her reproductive life with fewer
children than she had initially intended to have, either because of declining fecundity
with age, or because of competing activities (Morgan and Rackin 2010). Recently,
scholars have suggested that the relationship between education and fertility – and,
presumably, fertility intentions – is positive in those countries in which institutional
arrangements support the compatibility of work and family life, as well as gender
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equity in the family and in the labour market (Hobson and Ola´h 2006; Matysiak
2011; Neyer 2013). A multi-level analysis conducted in the 28 countries of the
European Union (Testa 2014) demonstrated that women of reproductive ages tend
to invest more in both human capital and family size if they live in an institutional
context that supports work-life balance; that is, in a country where having a career
and having children are not seen as mutually exclusive choices. Interestingly, this
study has suggested that both being highly educated and living in a country with
a high share of college educated women are positively associated with wanting to
have one or two children. A hypothesis that stems from this empirical evidence
asserts that supporting the reconciliation of work and family life for highly educated
women of advanced reproductive ages might have positive spill-over eﬀects for
highly educated women who have yet to complete their reproductive careers (Testa
2014).
3 Educational differences in intended and actual childbearing
When making assumptions about future trends in fertility among highly educated
women, the ﬁrst issue to consider is whether these women want to have more
children than they currently have. In earlier research, I demonstrated that highly
educated women are no less likely than their less educated counterparts to say they
want to have two children (Testa 2012). The intention to have a two-child family
is the predominant norm among women and men of all educational levels. One
explanation for the near-universality of this normative level is that there are speciﬁc
reasons for wanting to have one or two children that are shared by people of all
social strata: i.e., the desire to become a parent and the desire to ensure that the ﬁrst
child has a companion. An alternative explanation for the prevalence of the two-
child norm is that after controlling for age, highly educated women and men are
more likely than their less educated counterparts to be observed at relatively early
stages of their reproductive careers, since they tend to delay childbearing, and are
thus unlikely to have started realising their fertility plans. Thus, the lifetime fertility
intentions of highly educated people are artiﬁcially inﬂated, especially if they are
being monitored at low parity levels (zero or one child). Meanwhile, less educated
women at parity zero are more selected; i.e., they may be less family oriented
or they may have yet to encounter the obstacles and experiences that lead many
women with children to reduce their initial intentions. If this discrepancy is not
merely the result of a selection bias, the relatively high fertility intentions expressed
by highly educated women may be seen as a sign that their fertility levels could
increase in the future. If we assume that the fertility levels of the highly educated
will converge with the fertility levels of their least educated counterparts, we may
expect that in the years to come, fertility levels will increase, especially in countries
in which the fertility gap between educational groups is large, like the Eastern
European countries (among the female cohorts born in the 1960s, the diﬀerence in
the number of children born to women with high and with low levels of education
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is almost one child in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Russia); and will be lower
in countries in which the diﬀerences in fertility levels by education are smaller, like
the Scandinavian countries (the diﬀerences in completed fertility range from 0.04 in
Finland to 0.17 in Norway). Interestingly, for the cohort born in 1972, the countries
with the largest diﬀerences in completed fertility by education are those with the
lowest completed fertility levels; while the countries with the smallest diﬀerences
in completed fertility by education are those with the highest completed fertility
levels (Sobotka et al. 2015).
4 Forces supporting a positive education-fertility link
Prior to the fertility transition, there was a clear positive relationship between social
status and the number of surviving children. With the decrease in infant mortality
— a trend that began in the higher social classes in almost every country — and
the subsequent decline in fertility, a negative or neutral status-fertility relationship
emerged (Skirbekk 2008). In recent years, there has been a negative relationship
between educational attainment and ﬁrst births, mainly due to the postponement of
childbearing (see, among others, Brand and Davis 2011; Santarelli 2011; Martı´n-
Garcı´a and Baiza´n 2006; Billari and Philipov 2004; Rindfuss et al. 1996). This
trend is attributable in part to the conﬂict between enrolment in education and
childbearing (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991). Higher income couples tend to want
their children to reach at least the same levels of social and economic status as
they have; which may mean having fewer children, and at a later stage of life
(Dalla Zuanna 2007). Another potential causal mechanism could run in the opposite
direction: women who have children while still enrolled in education are less likely
to achieve a high level of education (Cohen et al. 2011).
By contrast, a positive relationship between education and fertility after the
transition to parenthood has been documented in several countries (Hoem and Hoem
1989; Hoem et al. 2001; Ko¨ppen 2006; Gerster et al. 2007; Kravdal and Rindfuss
2008). The sign of this association has been attributed to the eﬀect of “uncontrolled”
unobserved heterogeneity, which is interpreted as family proneness (Kravdal 2001;
Kravdal 2007; Kreyenfeld 2002). According to this interpretation, once a woman
has decided to become a mother, education has a positive eﬀect on her propensity
to have an additional child. Thus, a woman with strong family proneness may
be expected to interrupt her working career to devote herself to childbearing and
childrearing. Importantly, failing to account for such a self-selection mechanism in
parity-speciﬁc modelling would result in biased estimates that suggest that there is a
positive relationship between a woman’s education and the progression to a second
(or higher) birth order. Scholars have also oﬀered substantive arguments for why
a highly educated woman might have a greater propensity to have an additional
child than a less educated woman. For example, a highly educated woman may
have a relatively secure position in the labour market, as better educated women
are especially likely to have a protective labour contract, a ﬂexible work schedule,
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or a stable position in the public sector (Esping-Andersen 2013). In addition, a
highly educated woman may have a relatively high family income that allows her
to outsource child care (Ermish 1989). Moreover, a highly educated woman may
be especially likely to appreciate the emotional returns of parenthood, given the
diﬀusion of more child-friendly preferences among “cultural elites” (Kravdal 2001).
Other scholars have argued that some highly educated women may not be as
career-oriented as is commonly assumed (Sobotka and Testa 2006); and that these
women are especially likely to be in a gender-equal relationship, which is known
to stimulate the formation of a second birth intention (Mills et al. 2008) and the
progression to higher birth orders (Brodmann, Esping-Andersen and Gu¨ell 2007;
Duvander, Lappegård and Andersson 2010).
All of these arguments suggest that the increase in the number of highly educated
women does not necessarily imply that a decrease in third birth order fertility is
inevitable. In Italy, for example, education has been found to have a positive eﬀect
on the propensity to have an additional (a second or a third) child among women
born in the northern regions of the country in the 1970s and the 1980s. This ﬁnding
supports the claim that both the decline and the turnaround in fertility levels are
driven by the same social group: i.e., highly educated couples (Impicciatore and
Dalla Zuanna 2016). An analogous situation might be observed in other European
and low-fertility settings (Esping-Andersen 2009; Esping-Andersen and Billari
2015).
5 Concluding remarks
I conclude with some reﬂections on the expectations for fertility among highly
educated women in light of the literature, the empirical evidence, and the
hypothesised mechanisms outlined above. First, a further postponement of
motherhood among highly educated women may be predicted, as we can assume
that highly educated women will continue to condition their start of childbearing
on the achievement of other life goals, like ﬁnding stable employment or getting
married. This is particularly likely to be the case in countries that have been severely
aﬀected by economic crises, and thus have high unemployment rates (Goldstein et al.
2013), increasingly precarious employment arrangements, and ﬁnancial challenges
(Testa and Basten 2014). Cohabitation, especially in the form of a prelude to
marriage, can smooth the negative education-fertility link, even though fertility is
still more likely to occur within marriage (Hiekel et al. 2014). It is diﬃcult to make
any predictions for the future use of contraception. Research conducted in the US
has shown that unintended or miss-timed fertility is still more prevalent among
women with low than with high levels of education (Hayford and Guzzo 2011).
A similar observation has been made for Italy, where it was found that the transition
to a third child is often unplanned among women with low levels of education
(Castiglioni et al. 2001). Second, it may be expected that highly educated women
will become more likely to have two or more children if the incomplete gender
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revolution – i.e., the revolutionary change in women’s roles proposed by Esping-
Andersen (2009) – evolves into a completely gender-equal system in which partners
with similar levels of education will both pursue careers and evenly share in home
production. Facilitating the reconciliation of work and family life and promoting
gender equality in the family and in the labour market might help to resolve the
role conﬂict that seems to be at the heart of the persistently low fertility levels
in ageing societies. However, in predicting future fertility trends, it is important
to consider the migration backgrounds of highly educated women. Having a high
educational level increases an individual’s ability to meet settled fertility targets,
but having certain capacities and the skills necessary to master one’s life in a given
geographical context does not necessarily translate into having these skills in other
socioeconomic, cultural, and geographical contexts (Wingens et al. 2011).
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